The 56th Division

LES OF A

RPE, 1917-THE THIRD BATTLE

took over the front line between Achicourt and Agny, to the south of Arras, with the 30th Division on the right and the 14th Division on the left. Two

d dirt"! It was a normal condition for trenches, and one might well be excused for wondering if the Italians or the forces in Salonica fared any

scouts of the 2nd London Regt., lying close to the enemy wire as dawn was breaking on the 18th, came to the conclusion that the enemy line was not normal. [Pg 1

to follow the example of the 2nd London Regt., and all Headquarters were buzzing with excitem

the third line. The Corps order for the advance, however, was cautious. It pointed out the probability of the enemy withdrawing to a main line of defence, Telegraph Hill, a

eed holding Neuville Vitasse, and on the left he was found at Tilloy, the Harp, Telegraph Hill,

lient in preparation to a bigger operation. It was the intention of Sir Douglas Haig to attack the salient from both sides-the Fifth Army in the south operating [Pg 116] on the Ancre Front, and t

tirement must be limited, as the enemy had no intention of giving up the Vimy Ridge on our First Army front. Indeed,

nch offensive was launched in the south, and so the Fifth Army was ordered to follow the enemy closely to the Hindenburg Line, where it would exert th

rcatel, Hill 90, the German third-line system from Feuchy Chapel, and the high gr

the objects of the attack remain the same; that is, to break through the enemy's defensive line on the right of the Third Army front, to overrun all his defences as far as the

ision had a very small r?le allotted to it. The first attack was to be delivered by the 56th and 14th Divisions with the VI Corps on

conform on the right, but even so would not approach the enemy main line), and to the 14th Division the piercing of the

River and in possession of St. Martin-sur-Cojeul, and the left through the Hinde

d cross their front and, passing entirely to the south bank of the Cojeul, would join hands with the troops of the VI Corp

of cavalry, no doubt a necessary [Pg 118] provision, but one which, nevertheless, was greeted with hilarity. One thing, howe

Hindenburg Line, he was still being closely pursued by the Fifth Army. By the 2nd April the general line was Sélency, Jeancourt, Epéhy, Royaulcourt, Doignies, Mercatel, Beaurain

n the front line. The bombardment of the enemy positions commenced on the 4th, and was

by the other two brigades. Some of the instructions and arrangements are worthy of no

o it, or of waiting for scientifically-arranged artillery barrages before advancing, must be discarded. [Pg 119] A slow advance will give time for the German reinforcements to arrive-the greater the rapidity o

ng new in it, and nothing to criticise in it, but man is a lover of precedent, and trench

, on the other hand, he is frequently the only man who knows anything at all. We learned, to our cost, the excellence of the German control of artillery fire, and though our artillery observation officers performed the most gallant feats, our method never seemed as good as that of the enemy. The instructions issued were in

with that in another place, merely noting here that platoons were now made up of one rifle section, one Lewis-gun section, one bombing section, and one rifle grenade section, and that a

a strong point, Neuville Mill, situated on the right and in a position to enfilade the attacking troops. On the 7th the 1st London Regt.

ril was on a front of fifteen miles, from Croisilles to the northern foot of t

and 12th London Regts. in line, the 14th in support, and the 4th in reserve. The Edinburgh Field Coy. R.E. (less two sections) were with the right brigade, and the 513th Field Coy. R.E. (less two sections), one company of the 5th Cheshires, and

ville Vitasse, and then the supporting battalion would "go through" them and capture the second defence, which was the Hindenburg, or Cojeul Swi

dark clouds rolled up, bringing heavy showers. The attack was started by

osition short of the Hindenburg Line. The 8th Middlesex Regt. were delayed at first by uncut wire, but soon entered the ruined village. Just before reaching the site of the church they found themselves confronted by a "pocket" of determined Germans with several machine guns. Working roun

d soon reached Moss Trench. Their reserve company, seeing that all was well,

e uncut wire which delayed them, but soon after ten o'clock they were in touch with the Kensingtons in Moss T

e supposed to work round the north of the village, onl

ved across the old German line and taken positions, about a thousand yards west of Neuvi

enburg Line, and an advance to Nepal Trench. This, as we have said, was to be done b

7th Middlesex Regt.-which was in reserve to the 167th Brigade, and was detailed [Pg 123] to attack and capture Nepal Trench after the Hindenburg Line had been made secure-ha

ted about two hours. They killed a number of the enemy, captured 100 of them and one machine gun, and overran the mass of trenches by 1,000 yards. On their left they

fter the 167th Brigade-had failed, and this failure enabled the enemy in Egg and the adjacent tre

de, and the Queen Victoria's Rifles from the 169th Brigade. So when it was seen that the 1st London Regt. had failed to make progress, the 7th Middlesex a

singtons forward into that part of the Hindenburg Line which [Pg 124] the London Scottish ha

at 6 p.m. is s

Wancourt Line at 6.45 p.m., which attack, owing no doubt to

ull pointed out that fighting was still going on, that the situation would not be clear until daylight, and that his division would not be able to attack

Line on their front, but they were still giving much trouble from the 30th Division area. The London

on the right, but at 10.45 a.m. the Corps issued a more ambitious o

d to clear the Hindenburg Line on the 30th Division front. In this maze of trenches the 167th Brigade made steady progress towards the junction of the Hindenburg and [Pg 125] Wancourt Li

claimed to be in the Wancourt Line, and eventually it was found that they had swerved to their left and cr

en Victoria's Rifles cleared the Hindenburg Line as far as the Cojeul River, and a long length of Nepal Trench, which was part of the Wancourt Line. The difficulty of the 30th

e artillery. The situation demands that as many batteries as possible be

ade late in the afternoon, after three da

Heninel, and later, [Pg 126] when the 30th Division had occupied the Hindenbu

ould not bomb each other. To the great amusement of the men the words "Rum jar" were chosen. The Germans, being bombed from both sides, must have thought it an odd slogan. The enemy were then seen withdrawing from Heninel, and the leading company of the 2nd London Regt. immediately advanced a

s of the London Rifle Brigade about eleven o'clock. The 14th Division moved two battalions, one on either side of the village, with a view to continuing the advance to the high ground east of the Cojeul Ri

relieved the 30th, failed to advance; on the left the 50th Division, which had relieved the 14th on the preceding night, also failed to advance, having

no one on their left. About five hundred yards in front of them were some practice trenches which the enemy had used for bombing. Capt. Newnham writes of the attack dissolving about the line of these trenches. Apparently Guemappe had not been taken on the

he 151st Brigade attack was ordered with their left flank on Wancourt Tower, which was our left and the dividing-line between brigades. Great confusion consequently on our left front, where two battalions of Durhams were mixed up with the Queen'

the practice trenches. But these gallant fellows soon found themselves in a very lonely position, and as the 30th and 50th Divisions fa

front. On the left, however, the enemy attacked and recaptured Wancourt Tower from the 50th Division. This point was not retaken by us until the next day, but the

e Canadians, and of Monchy by troops of the Third Army, gave us positions of great importance and improved the situation round Arras. The feeling of the 56th Division was that it had been a great fight, and that they had proved themselves undou

oubtedly inflicted a terrifying defeat

, colossal efforts are needed to make good the damage.... A day like 9th April threw all calculations to the winds. Many days had to pass before a line could really be formed and consolidated. The end of the crisis, even if troops were available, depended very lar

suggests that "the English did not seem to have known h

this battle Sir Dou

al [Pg 130] results were likely to be gained by following up a success on the front about Arras, and to the south of it, beyond the capture of the obj

commenced as soon as possible after the Arras offensive, and continued

aig intended that they should secure; they inflicted great loss on the enemy, more than 13,000 prisoners and over 200 guns; they drew German reserves until at the end of the operations there were twice as many enemy troops on that

the much-discussed operations under Gen. Nivelle, and, in order to assist, Sir Douglas Haig agreed to continue the operations round Arras longer than was his first intention. Plans, which had bee

h this fact in mind. They were: the Second Battle of the Scarpe, 1917, 23rd-24th April; the Battle of Arleux, 28th-29th April; the Third Battle of th

st at Couin and then at Hauteville. On the 25th Gen. Hull was ordered to hold himself in readiness to move into either the VI or the VII Corps, and the next day was defi

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shoots out a number of spurs towards the Cojeul River to the south. The position taken over by the 167th Brigade was from a small copse south-east of Monchy to the Arras-Cambrai road, about 50

2nd London Regt., the 1st London Regt., and the 7th Middlesex Regiment. The Queen Victoria's Rifles were in support of the Queen's Westmin

nt at Arras on the 3rd. While the Third and First Armies attacked from Fontaine-les-Croisilles to Fresnoy, the Fifth Army launched an

om their assembly trenches. As soon as the first waves topped the crest, they were met with a withering machine-gun and rifle fire. The ground was confusing and the darkness intense-off

rds on the right, and were digging in near a factory (Rohart) on the bank of the Cojeul, and the 14th Division on their right seemed to hav

pit near the factory and a trench about the same place; the 2nd London Regt. had a footi

he Stokes mortars, rushed and secured the farm. They found a number of dugouts, which they bombed, and secured 22 prisoners. The farm was connected with Tool Trench, a

rties did undoubtedly overrun Tool, and, crossing a sunken road known as Stirrup Lane, reached Lanyard Trench, quite a short distance from the men of the London Rifle Brigade, who had lodged themselves in the pit near Rohart Factory. [Pg 134] They were, however, not in sufficient numbers to join hands with th

eft of the 56th declared that their men were in the northern end of Tool. They asked that the artillery should be lifted off the trench, as they were going to bomb down towards the Queen

ess at the start, had been violently counter-attacked, and at 11.50

were back in the line they had started from; he ascertained that none of his brigade were north of the Arras-Cambrai r

The Battles

ttles of

About 10 o'clock [Pg 135] in the evening the Germans started a fierce bombardment of the tongue of land held by the London Rifle Bri

morning with the exception of Cavalry Farm. But they were in a bad situation. With the enemy holding the Cambrai road in force, the only communication with the advanced troops was down the bottom of the valley, a

cessful start of the battles of Arras. Hindenburg and Ludendorff were putting into effect their new system of holding the front in depth, but thin in the forward zones, with many machine guns, and strong supports for immediate counter-attack. It seemed as though their system had broken down at

, and were relieved by the 168th on the 5th May. The latter

kind, when the two brigades lost just on a thousand men, really audacious reconnoitring deserves the highest praise. Again and again attempts were made by patrols to enter Tool Trench, onl

sing large numbers of Germans to run over the open and seek safer groun

ight and the London Scottish on the left attacked Cavalry

our line, and the 4th London Regt. swept into this place with no difficulty. [Pg 137] But the right of the enemy line was able to put up a fight, and the left company of the London Scottish suffered somewhat severely. Except for this one point, the trench was vacated by its garrison in a wild scr

opse it was Tool and to the north it was Hook. The very northern end of Tool and all of Hook remained in the han

trenches were dug to the old line. Meanwhile the trench mortars kept up a steady bombardment of Hoo

mplating a retirement. Patrols, however, always found Lanyard Trench and Hook fully garrisoned. The 167th Brigade had taken over the line from the 168th, and the 8th Mi

ok Trench and the support line behind it. The Middlesex men gained the junction of Hook and Tool, but were very "bunched"; the 187th Brigade on the left made no progre

ops of the 56th Division were

guns in the field. The enemy barrage was considered the heaviest that had, as yet, been encountered. The positions attacked were well sited and frequentl

o push forward too fast for fear of losing touch with the wave in front of them. Consequently, by the time the leading wave was approaching Tool Trench, all the rear waves

ppreciate these difficulties. If it goes well it i

e 29th April to 21st May were 7

ed their object, but on the whole the French offensive was disappointing. On the British front, however, 19,500 prison

d, and First Armies were to continue operations, with the forces left to them, with the object of keeping the enemy in doubt as to whether the offensive would be continued. Objectives, of a limited nat

ts concerning them. They involved, however, the disadvantage that I frequently found myself unable to den

ur concentrated artillery nineteen mines were exploded, and our troops swept forward all along the line. B

(formed in 1916 at Souastre), and diaries have the welcome entries "troops resting" as the only event of the day. But this was not for long. Battalions were soon back in

ed a form of official diary which is a delight to read-concise, but with occasional reflections of

ion in the line. The position was the same-Tool Trench from the copse, on t

e visualised stretching across the valley, with right and left flanks of the division on the high ground on either side of the river. From the right good observation was o

7.30 a.m., the former launched an attack on Hook Trench. The attack was a comp

y movement behind a wood (Bois du Vert) which was opposite the 3rd Division and on the left flank of the 56th. Careful watching revealed the massing

ly wounded, they would sometimes show a great disinclination to fire on Germans walking in the open behind the enemy lines. It seemed as though the idea was that the particular German in question was not trying to inj

of artillery, machine-gun, and rifle fire met them. The Queen's Westminster Rifles, of course, could not fire, but they watched the action with great joy, and kept Brigade and Divi

a.m. This time they succeeded in entering two posts, but the 3rd Division dr

irmishing round a post. The division was relieved

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would lead to confusion. They supported the 56th Division during the battle of Arras-in the original scheme-a

re not under my command again until the end of May, as I remained with the 56th Division and commanded the artillery covering them.

mensely.... On the 5th July the 56th Divisional Artillery returned to my command, and we started to march to the Ypres area, and arrived at Oudezeele on the 13th July 1917. This was a very clean and comfortable village, and all ranks were well billeted. We remained there until the 28th July, a very pleasant and well-earned rest for both officers and men, beautiful weather, and many sports were organised for officers

ch included the lighter guns included also conditions which rendered the comfort of artillerymen scarcely more enviable than that of