The 56th Division

MB

nvoorde and Wippenhoek. These forward areas did not give uninterrupted rest; frequent and close attention was paid t

of Eperleques. The 5th Cheshire Regt., however, remained in the battle area until the 29th. A further move started on t

he soldier, and we find the divisional canteen being enlarged-a greengrocery, eggs, and butter

me a period when everyone was mad on throwing bombs, and the rifle was neglected. At the end of [Pg

y was armed. Exclusive of Headquarters, twenty-eight other ranks was the minimum strength, and when the platoon was below that strength the necessary numbers w

le and bayonet were for assault, for repelling attack, or for obtaining superiority of fire, and the training of this section was considered of much importance. Each man should be a marksman,

g attacks and the duties of "moppers-up." These last individuals should work in pairs. They were to drop into their objectives and work laterally outwards. They killed the enemy met wi

nd was used to dislodge the enemy from behind cover and to drive h

bility and the small target it presented made it pe

, runners, and Lewis gunners who carried 50 rounds) carried at least 120 rounds of rifle ammunition and 2 bombs. The Lewis-

x grenades. With this organisation training was carried out i

n order to leave 10 officers and 50 other ranks out of line for "reconstruction." They would not be available as reinforcements, but were, generally, specialists and good instructors, on whom the battalion

mand of General Byng, General Allenby having been given comma

rs and 1,754 other ranks; the Machine Gun Company, 7 officers and 150

2,802 other ranks; the Machine Gun Company, 7 officers and 160 oth

1,921 other ranks; the Machine Gun Company, 10 officers and 145 ot

e period of rest was over the division

th Brigade, 3rd Division, in the Lagnicourt section. The 169th Brigade relieved the 8th Brigade in the Louverval section on the 5th; an

t the gem of these small enterprises was that of the Queen's Westminster Rifles. On the 29th September 2/Lieut. W. H. Ormiston, with thirty men, lay in wait in the middle of No Man's Land and successfully ambushed a patrol of fifteen Germans. Eleven were killed and two brought in; unfortunately, the remaining two proved

d gas projectors were dug in

were found alert and the parties failed to enter the German line. The Kensingtons, however, were successful

as a visit of ten days of Major-Gen. Bloxom, U.S.A., with

he division remai

V Corps, No. H.R.S. 17/48" was received,

right to left (and later, the V Corps). The III Corps had its right on 22 Ravine, between Villers-Guislain and Gonnelieu, and its left to the east of Trescault. Then came the IV Corps, with its left north of Lagnicourt, on a little

nced for attack. Several actions had been fought on this sector before it settled down to a "quiet sector"; assembly trenches exist

attack might benefit the Italian Armies and also improve the position on the Western Front. But there was the obvious difficulty of a lack of troops at Sir Douglas Haig's disposal; the Flanders adventure had been a most costly one for us, for practically the whole of the British Army had passed through the salient inferno Ypr

d of Tanks on a front from Gonnelieu to Hermies, seize the crossings of the Canal de l'Escaut at Masnières and Marcoing,

ns into Cambrai, and to occupy the crossings of the Sensée between Paillencourt and Pal

icipate in further operations to complete the surrounding of all the enemy forces

s three companies) would secure the canal crossings at Marcoing and Masnières, and form a flank from Gonn

e, Tank Corps, would attack with two divisions, on the left of the III Corps,

d, as speed was the essence of the operation, in order to obtain liberty of movement before the enemy could organise either counter-attack or a f

g a line from Noyelles, along the Canal de l'Escaut, through Fontaines, and relieve the cavalry on

he greatest care should be taken not to divulge the presence of increased artillery to the enemy. Registrati

mmunition would be constructed. But little more than this could be done in the time at the disposal of the Army. In any case, the accumul

to cover the advance of the Tanks), and the neutralisation of hostile batteries, the bombardment of positions of assembly, rest billets, telephon

mber of troops when concentrated, but no extensive scheme of hutting or new camps could be undertaken. In thick woods tents, suitably camouflaged, could be erected, and in thin woods wire netti

the infantry was brought into the area, to have the extra infantry in the area

o note particularly whether any of the work b

d been captured, the IV Corps would secure a line Rumancourt-Buissy-Inchy, which would cut off the German divisions in the Quéant salient and threaten with immediate capture their gun positions. [Pg 174] In this mo

ble for joining hands with the 109th Brigade, 36th Division, and with them attack in the direc

a battle, with death and destruction going on all round them, men will be as keen as children in carrying out the

by making dummy figures of men to act as supporting infantry. The Tanks were to be put out in No Man's Land during the night, and would be half hidden by the smoke barrage in the morning

res and dummy Tanks was taken in hand at once, and by the 19th November a dozen full-sized Tan

bourhood of Quéant-250 rounds a day being fired-the Germans would probably th

but the greatest care had to be exercised not to make improvements of an apparent nature. In the back areas, however, the strain was becoming intolerable. There were troops in every hole and

ied their positions in line, but the old troops remained in the outpost line in case the enem

ave a concentrated force ready to act in case of necessity. So on the night of the 18th the 167th Brigade extended its l

m. on the 20th gas drums were projected into the German lines where the wire-cutting had taken place (Quéant), and

figures moved them up and down in as lifelike a manner as they could, and oth

s opened frantic and furious fire with machine-guns and a

est bank of the canal from the Spoil Heap to the Bapaume-Cambrai road,

rver reports, seized Marcoing and Masnières. The first bit of bad luck happened at Masnières, where the enemy had only partially destroyed the iron bridge over the Escault Canal. It might have been sufficiently strong for cavalry to cross over, or it might have been repaired to enable them to do so, but a Tank attempted to cross first and broke through

similar way and secured the crossing. But in Marcoing oth

nights of the 16th, 17th, and 18th all the Tanks were moved into Havrincourt Wood, and except that a battery of 6-inch howitzers got into difficulties farther north, and that a lorry "ran into a train carrying Tanks," the whole concentration was carried out as desired. But, although we do not believe it made much diff

wide lanes through it and the troops advanced steadily. There [Pg 178] was some obstinate fighting in Havrincourt village and park, where parties of the enemy held out until the afternoon

h resistance at the village of Flesquières. The infantry were prevented from advancing by machine guns and uncut wire, and the Tanks, which came up on the ridge, were at once put out of action by field guns, which had been pulled out of

th, still farther on the left, had moved along the canal to the Cambrai road. And on the right troops of the

they were ordered to push forward through the Hindenburg Support Line, but found that Flesquières was still in the hands of the enemy, and they were unable to pass. About 2.30 p.m. they were ordered to pass at least two regiments by Ribecourt and Premy Chapel and work round Flesquières from the north-east and assist the 51st Division in their attack from the south. But they found they were unable to carry out this co-operation on account of the delay which had occurred, due to their first effort, and also that Nine Wood was no

Graincourt and to the west of Flesquières, where they connected with the 51st Division. Farther to the right of the IV Corps the III Corps had also pushed well forw

, 6-inch Howitzer battery were placed under the orders of each of the 36th, 62nd, and 51st Divisions. But a fortunate circumstance arose: it was found difficult to get the heavy artillery across No Man's Land into the Flesquières salient, and the congestion there was such that the suppl

d along the German outpost line in touch with the 109th Brigade, who were clearing the Hindenburg L

the Canadian Cavalry and King Edward's Horse would seem to suggest that the opportunity of passing other cavalry through had been missed, there remained one day when, given [Pg 181] success, they could still be employed. The 51st and 62nd Divisions were therefore ordered to capture the Bourlon position, when the 1st Cavalry Division would follow up the attack and seize the passages of the C

ivision captured Anneaux and Anneaux Chapel, after heavy fighting, and made more progress north of the Cambrai road, where they established themselves on the ridge west of Bourlon Wood, and also gained a further stretch of the Hindenburg Support Line. On the left of the 62nd the 36th Division advanced along the west bank of the canal, meeting increased opposition, and for a time held the south of the v

of Bourlon was not achieved. At nightfall the 51st Division was holding a line north of Cantaing forward to Fontaine, making a dangerous salient, and then in a westerly direction to the north of Anneaux, where, joining with the 62nd, the line was carried north of the Cambrai road, forming another salient north of the Sugar Factory.

ff these attacks. But the forty-eight hours had expired, and the high ground at Bourlon Village and Wood, as well as certain tactical features to the east and west of the wood, still remained in the enemy's hands. It seemed fairly clear that the sur

ely commanded by the Bourlon Ridge, and unless the ridge were gained it would be impossible to hold them, except at excessive co

the ground to the north, which sloped gently down to the Sensée River. The enemy's defensive lines south of the Scarpe and the Sensée Rivers would thereby be turned, his communications exposed to the observed fire of our artillery, and his positions

een definitely stayed, the enemy had not yet developed such strength about Bourlon as it seemed might not be overcome by the numbers at my disposal. As has already been pointed out, on the Cambrai side

the Cambrai front might reasonably be expected to exercise an important effect, no matter what measures of success attended my efforts. Moreover, two divisions

ns, therefore, I decided to continue the

Wood which, although it did not succeed in driving them back, prevented any advance. And about 10.30 they attacked F

en in the morning. On the left of the 62nd, the 36th were unable to gain ground on the east of the canal,

ambrai road, and to advance, in conjunction with the 109th Brigade, at 11 o'clock along the front trench of the Hindenburg Line which runs to Tadpole Copse. They would also work their way up the communication trenches to the second line of the Hindenburg first system, and clear both lines as far as Tadpole Copse. The London Rifle Brigade were ordered to assemble in the captured Hinde

as the preliminary operation, was for the 36th Division to move forward through M?

ds every five minutes. The division, until the night 21st/22nd, had been covered by the 281st Brigade R.F.A. only-as was usual in these battles, the artillery

y the [Pg 186] case in bombing fights. Colone

g it back. At 12.30 p.m. a runner came with a request for more bombs, and the news that our men had passed the Boursies-M?uvres

vers, who reported at 2.40 p.m. that the enemy were shelling Tadpole Copse. Not until 5.30 was it known for certain that t

t the attack would not be continued that day, and so formed a flank from the south of Tadpole Copse to the old British line, although for the moment they were unable to dislodge the enemy from

: Local Map

nt of the Divisio

at the Cambrai road, although the [Pg 187] enemy kept up a persistent shelling of the road, and particularly of the po

een's Westminsters, an important gain as it occupies the high ground to the west of M?uvres. But

the chief objective being Bourlon village. The 51st Division was to attack it from the east and the 40th from the south-west; but when it became known that the 51st Division had been drive

to darkness and the congested state of the trenches, the London Scottish were late in getting into their assembly positions, but as they were

. The Germans could thus directly enfilade the front and support trenches with rifle and machine-gun fire from the other side of the valley, where they had built strong blocks and loopholes during the night. The battalion was thus held up at this point until 2.30 p.m. By this time "D" Company had, with the assista

British maps and is only indicated by the very unsatisfactory sign of "banks." An imaginative person might have traced the re-entrant starting in square 7 rig

d-it is extraordinary how many bombs can be thrown on such occasions-and the support line was lost as far as the Inchy road, but the front line

ly penetrated. Repeated and heavy counter-attacks forced the 40th Division out of Bourlon village to the north edge of Bourlon Wood. The 36th Division had captured and again been forced out of M?uvres, and had not been able to make much progress on the ea

tack Bourlon village with the assistance of twelve Tanks at noon. The Guards Division were to consolidate the line taken over from the 51st, and the 36th an

169th was still in the Hindenburg Line on the right. The main strength of the division was concentrated, of course, about the Hindenburg Line to the west of M?uvres, wh

e Copse, but not without a strong fight. The enemy came down all communication trenches at once, while small parties of snipers advanced from shell-hole to shell-hole over the open. The attack was pressed s

Corps we must not lose sight of the doings of that corps, which continued to press towards the north, with the 56th Division on it

eved by the Rangers (12th London), in view of an attack to r

ds with the 4th Londons. The attack started at 1 p.m. and progressed very satisfactorily for a while; but the fighting was very hard and the men very tired. The 4th London at one time reached the [Pg 191] Inchy road, but their arrival there seems to have coincided with a particularly violent effort of the ene

on Wood. They were relieved by the 62nd during the night. Three dismounted battalions of the 2nd Cavalry Divi

on Tadpole Copse spur, was not only exposed but being constantly attacked. Two brigades were involved in the fighting about the Hindenburg system, and, in addition, were holding a flank 2,000 yards long connecting up to the old British front line. The remaining brigade was holding 5,500 yards of British line, and had also to supply one battalion each night to work in the captured

rs and the Kensingtons, and on the following two day

ced by the 2nd Division; the 1st Cavalry Division, which had taken part in the fighting up to this time, was

th divisions entered their objectives, the positions were not held. The resources of the Army were considered to be almost ex

d relieved the Guards on the next day, while the 47th Division

as also not good. It will have been noticed that, after the first rush, the fighting was done by the IV Corps against the northern side of the salient

y to expect an attack on the 29th, no very great preparation for such an event seems to have been made. The divisions did all they could. The 12th Division on the right of the Corps moved the two battalions in divisional reserve nearer the line, and org

m. The most likely places for concentration to be selected by brigadier-generals commanding infantry brigades in consultation with group commanders. In case of enemy attack all posts and trenches will be held to the last at all costs, and there will be no retirement from any line to another line. The action of troops available for

d 62nd Divisions had already sta

d a big attack on the III and IV Corps with the intention of pi

ck being directed at the junction of the 55th and 12th Divisi

ere was a heavy bombardment and the Divisional Artillery had opened fire on S.O.S. lines at 6.30 a.m. Also on the evening of t

is another one for which I have no evidence to show what actually happened to bring about those situations. From all accounts the flanks of t

d. The main attacks were, I consider, made along the Banteaux Ravine, keeping south of the Banteaux Spur; up the ravine from Banteaux to [Pg 195]

must have been caught by the artillery and machine-gun barrage during the assembly and the initi

emy never moved them an inch, but he advanced as far as Gouzeaucourt and w

sions seem to have been used, but, judging by the length of the attack and its feroc

ndon Territorials), the 2nd, and the 56th. On the 56th Divisional front th

left of the 169th Brigade front in the Hindenburg Line, the London Rifle B

the right and the London Scottish on the left, and the 4th London Regt. holding the defensive flank back to the old Bri

ieved by the 3rd Division, and

ion of the enemy on the east of Quarry Wood, between the wood and the canal, and just behind M?uvres, also a division entering M?uvres itself. But befor

e usual soft caps. The aerial activity increased, and soon heavy enemy fire was opened between M?uvres and Bourlon. The registration on the 56th Divisional front was followed by slow, steady

, was particularly heavy on the blocks in the captured communication trenches. Gradua

n: The Batt

attle of

led disaster would be inflicted on the British Army. The Germans tried hard. During the day no less than five set attacks were launched, the heaviest with eleven lines of infantry advancing in succession to the assault. We wish to emphasise the position of the IV and III Corps and the genera

ops of the 56th Division, had its disadvantages. Small bodies of defenders could inflict incalculable loss and, though

posts holding the blocks in the communication trenches, and the enemy infantry supplemented the bombardment with rifle grenades. The artillery lifted slowly, and as it moved so the infantry

calmness. The training of the division in the new organisation, with platoons composed of rifle, bombing, rifle grenadier, and Lewis-gun sections, combined with the coolness of the men now bore fruit. Volleys from the rifle grenadier sections shook the Germans as they emerged fr

poral Macintosh, of the 168th Battery. This corporal had done extraordinarily good work on the 24th, but on this occasion he surpassed his previous record. Captain Crawford writes of his utter disregard for his perso

w position with [Pg 199] another gun, and carried on firing incessantly; and later, when the stand of his gun was giving way thro

in the front line (the support line of the Hindenburg front system), on the right, in the centre, on the left. Hard fighting had reached the second line of the Queen's Westminsters and the 2nd Londons. Col. Pank, of the 8th Middlesex, was in his headquarter dug-out, situated in the support line (German front line), when he was told the enemy was in the front line; he ordered his runn

denly startled by finding the enemy in his line. But the fierce attack led [Pg 200] by Col. Pank shook the enemy, and though the London Scottish had their hands fairly full on their front and left flank, they dea

bombarded with enormous trench mortars, said to be 12-inch. In the expressive language of the Cockney, they were "bumped" from morning to night. To get some id

d in No Man's Land, as reinforcements, but in view of the un

rs and the 2nd Londons had suffered severe casualties. Everywhere the line stood firm in the old German front line. Two companies of the London Rifle Brigade had reinforced the Queen's Westmi

the orders of the 169th Brigade. The remaining battalions of the 167th Brigade and the 5th Cheshires were marching towards the ba

e Queen's Westminsters (in touch with the 2nd Division on the right), 2nd London, and 8th Middlesex, on whom the greatest weight of the attack had fallen, had

ss forward with their batteries; in fact, they believed they were going to break through, and the batteries could be seen galloping into action. On one occasion, about 1 p.m., a brigade of three German 77-mm. batteries raced into the open, and w

nything like the same intensity as was experienced on the Ypres front, or even on the Somme. Hostile aircraft were very active, flying low over the front line and battery posit

th Brigade of the 47th Division, holding the crest of the ridge running from Bourlon Wood to the Bapaume-Cambrai road. The attack came on, time after time, only to be hurled back by the fire of the guns and the machine guns, and

ide, the Third Army would have suffered a heavy defeat. There were some frantic telegrams sent at times. At 10.30 a.m. the 2nd, 47th, 59th, and 62nd Artillery were ordered to be prepared to move their guns from the Graincourt Valley, and to have their teams up in [Pg 203] readiness, but these same g

Fight. (Being an account of the operations of the 47th, 2nd, and 56th Divisions in the neighbourhood

ritish soldiers who, by their single-hearted devotion to duty, prevented what would have become a serious situation had they given way.... At 9.20 a.m. the enemy had been seen advancing from the north towards the Canal du Nord, and subsequently attack [Pg 204] after attack was delivered by him on both sides of the canal against the 6th and 169th Infantry Brigades. South of M?uvres the enemy succeeded in gaining an entry, but was driven back by a bombing attack after heavy fighting.... From M?uvres westward to Tadpole Copse a desperate struggle was taking place for the possession of the Hindenburg Line, in the course of which the enemy at one time reached the Battalion Headquarters of the 8th Middlesex Regt., attached to the 168th Brigade, 56th Division. Here the German infantry were stopped by the gallant defence of the officer commanding the battalion, who, with the assistance

eneral Headquarters took the trouble to print

relieved the 2nd London. On the 168th Brigade front the Rangers relieved the London Scottish and the 1st London the 8th Middlesex. The Queen's Westminsters and the 2nd London, being

and the S.O.S. went up. From movement noticed beforehand on the north-west of Tadpole Copse it seemed

56th, but, so as not to involve the 51st Division until the following ni

some interesting re

almost entirely trench fighting with bombs. No shortage of bombs occurred, but the men employed at the divisional dump (

positions within 200 yards of the enemy, being erected only at [Pg 206] night and dismantled by day. The reliable method of communication was

ng rather in line with the Inchy road, was somewhat subject to shell fire. 169th Brigade also, with the help of one company of Pioneers and one Field Company, dug a trench ... (1,300 yards), which was less

in barrage work outside the divisional area to cover the attack of the 36th and 62nd Divisions. They returned to divisional control on the night of the 20th November. On the 21st and subsequent days the headquarters of the Divisional Pool were in a central po

e success of the Germans on the southern side of the salient is one. Early in the proceedings General Sir O'D. Snow, commanding the VII Corps, is reported to have placed his fingers on a map at the point of Twenty-two Ravine, and said, "If I were a German, I should attack there"! No attempt was ever made to reinforce divisions before the German counte

f need at the unfettered discretion of the Third Army Commander. Part of the artillery of this force actually came into action, rendering valuable serv

r?" If they were still too far away, there were undoubtedly British divisions [Pg 208] quite close up and quite fresh whic

officers killed, 202 other ranks killed, 43 officers and 1,00

ype="