The 56th Division

RMAN O

BATTLE OF

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rt-Gouves-Wanquentin area; the 168th in the Warlus-Simencourt area; the 169th in the Bernaville-Dainville area. The next day the division moved into the XIII Corps area

avrelle and Oppy: Gavrelle was he

after the division took over the line it began to snow. Battalions had about a week in the front line, a week in support, and then in camp

try Regt., 5th Reserve Division. There were one or two bickerings between patrols, but

., and his Chief of Staff joined the divi

62nd Division took over

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ed U-boat campaign and America had broken off diplomatic relations with her. War was not declared between these two countries until April, and as an immediate consequence it in

ly over. They were free to undertake large operations with ambitious objects, provided they did not either break

omething before the American troops arrived and g

merican Armies by their U-boats. But the Russian debacle began with her defeat in Galicia in the latter part of July, and it soon became evident to the Entente that they would, before the American forces could be used, have to fight for their existence. They had, it is true, brought the Central Powers' offensive in Ital

nd though the Ypres battles in 1917 were a most costly affair to the British, the German losses had been sufficiently heavy to create consternation. Well might Ludendorff utter a cry of elation when events in Russia opened prospects of an earl

could stand against the Italians. Allenby, under whom the 56th Division had fought in April, had gone to Egypt in June, and by December had captured Jerusalem; and Turkey, at the end of her tether, lay at his mercy: even

number. Tens of thousands, we are told, crossed the frontiers into neutral countries, and a great many mor

ty divisions over the Entente on the Western Front. The plan was to attack with fifty to sixty divisions under massed artille

ps were arriving and tr

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or. Brig.-Gen. Elkington and his headquarters had, however, mo

d 18th the 56th Divisional Artillery returned to the division and took over in the line. This part of the front was at the time a very quiet one, but much harassing fire was done and a

er. From the 1st to the 3rd January an American General and his staff officers were attached to the division and went round battery positions and saw some shooting. On the 5th

antry having moved to the Villers-Chatel area. The R.A. Headquarters was established for the first four days at Bertincourt, and afterwards at the chateau at Berles, a very comfortable billet owned by a French

t very ardent during the divisional rest from the 9th

eir respective regiments. The 56th Division retained a certain number of the men, who were split up as follows: Queen Victoria's Rifles, 5 officers and 150 other ranks to the 13th London (Kensingtons), 12 officers and 250 other ranks to the 16th London (Queen's Westminster Rifles), 4 officers and 76 other ranks to the 4th London; the Rangers sent 8 officers and 300 other ranks to the London Rifle Brigade; while the

were reduced by a quarter-this is exclusive of the Canadian and Australian divisions, which retained

started on the 8th February, and on the 11th

rain. The result was that most of the trenches fell in. A period of feverish activity followed; engineers and pioneers were working every night, and the infantry had to provide as many men as wa

f" or "Red Tabs"-the arrangements made on this front at least were justified by the results-bu

gh they could not enumerate the difficulties of a gradual retirement, they seem to "sense" the fearful responsibility that is being thrust upon them. And the very nature of the situation caused orders to be gi

ed by outposts whose duty was to watch the enemy and retire on the next line if he attacked. The fight itself was to take place in what was called the "battle zone"; and behind was y

nces on which it might fall back, but we

rsed over the remaining front. It must be remembered that additional front amounting to 28 miles had been taken over by the British in January, and that Sir Douglas Haig was now

ce, Ludendorff says that ammunition dumps had been increased all along the British front, that movement of troops was carried out at night, but that German aviators sent up to report could see signs o

ays were being improved, artillery increased, and ammunition accumulated all along the front from Flanders to the

aig that the enemy preparations on the Arras-St. Quentin front were com

the considerations which influenced Sir Douglas Haig [Pg 218] through this anxious period; he could give up no ground in the northern portion of the British area where the Channel ports were threatened, and he knew that the ground was exceptionally dry and that preparations for an attack had been almo

s faced with strong forces about Ypres, that the condition of the centre (the Lys Valley) would not admit an attack before April (which was late in view of the Americans), that an

dments to previous instructions, calling for suggestions, and ever warning commanders against attack. The Cheshire Regt. and the Engineers of the 56th Division worked night and day at improving rear lines and constructing alternative ones; fatigue p

e army, but the officers were gradually being worked up to a s

ut 20 and capturing 4 Germans. The prisoners stated that the German offensive was imm

his way through and, followed by four men, managed to enter the German line and kill half a dozen of them. They secured

lines. Harassing fire by the 56th Divisional Artillery was increased, and with a good percentage of gas shells. The enemy s

of 44 miles, the artillery bombardment including the front held by the 56th Div

es behind the Russian front, had been so complete as to include the practising of infantry behind an actual, live barrage. The result was admirable. Swarms of men, followed reso

brai; the 2nd Army, of 17 divisions, immediately south of Cambrai; an

t able to cut off the Flesquières salient, near Cambrai, as had been planned. But during the night of 22nd/23rd March the Fifth Army was back at Peronne, and there was a deep bulge in

the scurrying motors and anxious faces of the [Pg 221] "soft job" men behind them, they would have been amazed. But the 56th Division just went on with the ordinary, somewhat strenuous routine which had been instituted at the commencement of the year, strength

front to a two-brigade front. Each of the two front-line brigades would have two battalions in line and one in reserve,

t this was cancelled on the 21st. On the 22nd a further warning order was given that the div

htly. But north of the Scarpe the 4th Division, on the right of the 56th, would not move until Monchy had been captured by the enemy, in which case the 56th Division would adjust their line to run through Beatty Post, Bailleul Post, to le Poin

to do something was becoming evident. At 5.30 p.m. on the 23rd he exploded a land mine under the wire in front of Towy Post, and appeared to be manning the line op

9th and 23rd (Reserve) Divisions, had occupied the Wotan Stellung, behind the front line, on the night of the 24th. These divisions had come from Riga, and would attack on the 26th together with the 240th and 5th Bavarian Reserve Divisions. They were to advance to a depth of four kilometres with the right flank on Oppy,

to fire on chosen targets through

hroughout the day of men and light railw

to relieve Gavrelle Post found it occupied by two dead men only-the remainder of the garrison had entirely disappeared. Signs of a

but the enemy was found more than ever on the alert, with parties lying out to catch patrols. It is curi

, encourage, and advise for the struggle. Some of the orders are not too easy to

w possible appearance enemy agents warn all ranks against use of word RETIRE. Any person using this word before or during an attack to be shot." This was, no doubt, based on a much-circulate

e to the Souchez River, on his left. This meant that the 56th Division had to relieve the 3rd Canadian Division, on the left, at Tommy and Arleux Posts during the night of 27th/28th March. At the same time the division was again ordered to treat the front line as an outpost line, and to fig

d, and Gavrelle lay in a slight depression; the ground rose again towards Bailleul East Post, and fell once more in the direction of O

l, Bradford, and Bird Posts with two companies [Pg 225] and one platoon, the remainder of the battalion holding posts on the Marine Trench line. The third battalion of the brigade, the 2nd London Regt., held the Ditch, Bailleul, and Bailleul East line. Behind t

s of the 4th London Regt., and two in support on the line Duke Street; and Tommy an

one company of the 1st Canadian Rifles were still holding Sugar Post. This latter company remained at Sugar Post throughout the battle, being placed, with that complete disregard of all, except the winning of the battle, which characterised the Canadians, under the orders of the 168

e 167th Brigade and three field companies o

ceptions, a matter of artillery. Brig.-Gen. El

lery and 9 guns of the 52nd Army (Field Artillery Brigade), or 45 18-pounders and 12 4·5 howitzers. Six 6-inch Newton mortars were in action in the first-line system, and three were covering the Bailleul-Willerval line (that is our main

upport line. At 4 a.m. the barrage increased over the whole of the front-line system and our posts were heavily bombarded with trench mortars. Fr

e time that these shell-holes were temporary trench-mortar emplacements, but from [Pg 227] information given by prisoners after the attack, it appears likely that they were the assembly positions of the assaulting troops. From 6.45 a.m. onwards "counter preparation" was put i

ent to destroy all life-it could not deal with the whole of the line. Towy Post and Wood Post had, during the last few days, been subjected to a great deal of enemy attention, and the posts had been move

there was no living soul there to oppose them, the machine gunners had the place under indirect fire from fourtee

almost at once, [Pg 228] by the rattle sound of Lewis guns, until the whole developed into what might be described as a roar. But the enemy was in Gavrelle and the undefended portions of the front line on either side of Towy Post.

ced into a small and cramped area; Lewis guns and rifles dealt with Germans in the open, clearing the ground rou

, directed his dwindling company to fight through the Germans in rear, using the remaining bombs, and swiftly,

Trench, and Lieut.-Col. Glazier, commanding the Queen's Westminste

ost line, and the enemy entered Humid Trench. Col. Glazier swung back his right flank into Towy Alley, and

n was almost non-existent. At the junction of Naval and Towy Trenches was a block, and in front of it the enemy was held, but the artillery, probably seeing the Germans in Humid and the end of Naval Trenches, pu

of the Germans on the line Keiller, Pelican, and Thames Posts. Every bit of the communication trenches which gave a good fire position, every dump-hole, even the shell-holes were manned, and, as the Germans advanced over the open,

position was: we held a block in Towy Alley, about 300 yards east of the Ditch-Bailleul East line, and Ca

heralded the attack commenced. All forward and lateral communication was at once cut. Wire and posts defending the front line were wiped out. When the enemy infantry advanced, they simply walked into the front line, rushed the few men left at the blocks in Belvoir and Brough, and commenced bombing towards Nav

unging horses and straining men across No Man's Land as far as Naval Trench, but each time he was defeated. The field guns fired no more than twenty rounds before being silenced by the 56th Divisional Artillery; and though the enemy infant

Brigade was placed under the orders of the 169th, and six machine guns were sent up to Point du Jour, and two fi

ore the bombardment and so was untouched. The full garrison was there to meet the enemy, who advanced in a solid line on the left of the wood, but came

garrison, consisting at first of 3 officers and 84 other ranks, though much depleted when the assault was launched, was overwhelmed by sheer numbers, and only 1 offic

tually overwhelmed by the storming infantry. Of the 2 officers and 48

and Viscount Street, but were held for a time by the troops in Ouse Alley. [P

de to advance over the open. But Wood Post fell back just before 9 o'clock, and soon after the enemy began to force their way up Ouse Alley from Viscount Street, in rear of t

y. The 169th Brigade on the right was back in the Bailleul-Willerval line; and while the advance companies of the 4th London were still holding the Marquis line, the enemy was in Ouse Alley and bombing his way towards the Bailleul line, also he was advancing ov

ssed by Colonel Marchmen

s of about a dozen. Although exposed to a heavy fire from front and flanks, they made excellent use of the ground, and s

invaluable aid to the 4th Londons, on the right, inflicting heavy losses by Lewis gun, rifle, and rifle grenade fire on the German support troops as they came up to the wood. A

hiefly centred on the fine stand which was being made by the Queen's Westminsters at Towy Post, where a power buzzer was installed, and messages were received from the signallers even after the capture of the post. At one time, while the 4th Londons were still holding the

ion posts. But, though the struggle was going on before them, observers found that both sides were frequently so mixed up t

division was reported to have lost touch with its own brigades, whi

were then in touch with the 4th Division, and the artillery was able to put down a protective barr

The First Batt

t Battle of

e shelling being [Pg 235] more of the nature of area shoots than definite counter-battery work. As a result, from dawn on the 28th to dawn on the 29th twelve 18-pounders were destroyed or put out of action by enemy shell-fire. In addition two 18-pounders in position as an enfilade section near Arleux, facing south-east, had to be destroyed and abandoned when our line was withdrawn to the Bailleul line. This section engaged many targets with observation from the vicinity of the guns, and was fought until our infantry withdrew through it. The detachments then retired after damaging the guns, burning the dug-outs, and removing dial sights and breach blocks. All the six 6-inch mortars in the front line were lost to the enemy, and no news was available as to the fate of the officers and detachments of the two that we

and tentative attacks were made. The situation, however, became more quiet about 6 p.m., [Pg 236] and the

ront of the new line, and patrolling was actively carried out. The Kensingtons penetrated into Arleux L

ther attacks, but it became evident that he was relieving his storming troops. As night fell, the first platoons of the 4th Canadian Division

e First Army Headquarters, where he wa

l divisions were to attack and capture the Vimy Ridge on the following day. South of the Scarpe eleven divisions were launched, with the object of capturing Arras and carrying the attack as far south as Bucquoy. The German official list (published 1919) gives eleven divisions attacking north [Pg 237] and south of

and 5th April, by an attack on the north and south of the Somme. "It was an established fact," says Ludendorff, "that the enemy's resistance was beyond our strength."

considering the weight of the attack and the immortal triumph gained by the 56th Division

ough to be a serious obstacle. When the smoke, which had enveloped the field at the commencement of the battle, had cleared, excellent observation was obtainable, and the divisional observers and artillery [Pg 238] observers did splendid work. The enemy batteries, which came into action in the o

les, and every attempt of the enemy to advance on the Bailleul line over the open was checked by these means. The fire-bays constructed along To

the Machine Gun Battalion served its guns to the l

quite inadequate to cover effectively such a wide front. But the infantry testify to the heavy losses inflicted on the e

y. Three of the teams disappeared with the garrisons in the left sector. Dur

inks that this may have been due [Pg 239] to the great weight carried by the German infantry, who seem, amongst othe

frank and interesting pape

trenches, and should be frequently changed. The garrisons should be small and frequently relieved. If rushed and captured from time to time, little harm is done, provided the garrison have no identification marks. Deep dug-outs in such posts are a positive danger and should not be allowed; shelters against the weather are ample. If heavily attacked, the r?le of such posts

actual position of the garriso

ight flank at the junction with the left of the 169th Brigade, about Viscount Street, [Pg 240] and covering Bradford and Mill Posts, had to be changed as the result of orders, and consequently this portion of the line (alw

cks on the flanks. The four forward guns only fired about 50 rounds before being surrounded. Had they been behind the main defensive line covering

out. Such blocks should be prepared ready again

e essential. To the fact that these points had received proper atten

nks prepared as s

sector must come under the senior machine-gun officer in that sector.... Nothing herein said, however, should be permitted to detract from

to the [Pg 241] enemy. Our main battle zone should not be covered by a single trench, e.g. the Red Line (Bailleul), but should consist of at least three trenches with strong points so constructed

rrectly synchronised. We have mentioned the service rendered by the Machine Gun Battalion, but, unfortunately, there is no record of Lieut.-Col. E. C. S. Jervis' dispositions. This gallant and able officer says that the "tender spots" in his defence were the low ridges running due east and west th

ed and engaged by low-flying aeroplanes, which also directed the fire of specially detailed heavy artillery. Needless to say, machine-guns are very vulnerable [Pg 242] to this form of attack; and we must also point out, having mentioned the capture of gu

A successful defence is more cheering to the infantry and artillery, inasmuch as they can more easily estimate the damage they do to the enemy; but it would not be fair to say that this was better than the hard fighting at Gommecourt and south o