The 56th Division

P

Corps, and they remained at Le Cauroy under the orders of that Corps until the 23rd

o England. He was looked upon as a friend as much as a commander, his striking personality had impressed itself on all ranks, and his tall figure was recognised from afar an

nday, the 9th July, when he came to Brigade Headquarters, I showed him the state of things. We went up the main C.T., and gradually the slime rose, first ankle, then knee, then thigh-deep. At length, where the C.T. ran in a hollow, I said,

enthusiastic in pr

hound." He encouraged his staff to play "bridge" whenever their work permitted, as a means of taking their minds off the war. All work and no play would have made even a G.S.O.1 a dull boy, and relaxation was not easy to find. He commanded the 4th Battalion Middlesex Regt. at Mons, and was given command of the 10th Brigade on th

division, as he returned later. Meanwhil

Sir Hubert [Pg 146] Gough, had been moved to take command of the greater part of the sali

* *

ions from the Motherland, 4 from Canada, 5 from Australia, 1 from New Zealand. One might, th

r as a whole, Sir

agreed on did not materialise. Russia, though some of her leaders made a fine effort at one period, not only failed to give the help expected of her, but even failed to prevent the enemy from transferring some for

the splendid effort made by Italy at a later period was, unfortunately, followed by developments whi

one throughout the year than was originally anticipated, and the [Pg 147] enemy's mean

as a steadying blow at the Germans; Kerensky came on the scene in Russia in May, and no doubt did his best, but discipline had gone, and the offensive of Brussiloff and Korniloff, though it succeeded at first, was well in ha

f their "will." The will to victory was going to crush the moral of their enemies. But although the Russian revolution caused great rejoicing, although the Ger

vived or we shall lose the war." There were speeches in the Reichstag containing the despairing cry that it was impossible to win the war. On the 7th July Hindenburg and Ludendorff met members of the Reichstag to discuss "our defensive attitude throughout the first half of 1917, the various failures near Arras, in the Wytsch?te salient, and in Galicia, where we had

any were giving her a

and Austrian nations were as one in their desire for war in August 1914, and so strong that they had little difficulty in winning the Turkish and Bulgarian nations to their cause. Then surely we may answer the question by saying tha

sy to appreciate the mind of a man who says "the military situation was good, but the condition of the country behind the army was bad." Country and army surely hang together. The Germans never looked upon war as a clash of armies alone, but sought by every means in th

an artillery preparation which had been growing in volume for a mon

Fifth Army and the First French Army gained the greatest success-the right of the Fifth Army and the Second Army did little more than capture th

an Commanders had already expressed anxiety as to the future conduct of their troops. Loss of lives and loss of moral had been responsible for a new method of defence. The [Pg 150] front line was to be held by few men an

t of all but the heaviest shell, and were admirably adapted for the defence of a place like Flanders, where dugouts were almost an impossibility. In fact, the new German pamphlet, "The Defensive Battle," was

ere were indications which had not escaped the eyes of the German Command. As to the hard, heart-breaking fighting of the Battles of Ypr

mmits of insignificant-looking "rises," not even worthy of the name of "hills," overlooked the whole of the French and British as

ench, every trace of new digging, every new track taped out, every building, every hamlet, every wood was bombarded by the enemy with guns and aeroplanes, which became extremely active at this period. As the concentration of troops incre

emy had another advantage, being on the defensive, and that was t

eryman attempted to give an adequate account of the conditions, and the horrors which they occasioned, he would not be believed. We w

The lowlying clayey soil, torn by shells and sodden with rain, turned into a succession of vast muddy pools. The valleys of the choked and overflowing streams were speedily transformed into long stretches of bog, impassable except by a few well-defined tracks, which became marks for the enemy's artillery. To leave these tracks was to risk death by drowning, and in the course of the subsequent fighting, o

the conditions is

all. It was mere unspeakable suffering. And through this world of mud the attackers dragged themselves, slowly but steadily, and in dense masses. Caught in the advance zone by our hail of fire they often collapsed, and the lonely man in the shell-hole breathed again. Then the mass ca

ESS COPSE AND GLENCO

AND GLENCORSE

soldier for the suffering he experienced at Ypres. But his own picture of the attackers

ecured. But on the right the II Corps was only partially successful. After overrunning the first system of defence about Hooge

er the II Corps. Major-Gen. F. A. Dudgeon assumed command of the division on the 10th; and on the 12th the division took over the line

* *

ote from Brig.-Gen. Elkingt

les in the ground covered with corrugated iron. The early dawn was the only time it was safe to get supplies and ammunition if casualties were to be avoided, and with all precautions most batteries lost 100 per cent. of their gun line strength in killed and wounded. The artillery supported operations on the 10th, 12th, 16th, and 25th August, and answered S.O.S. calls on most days; also a very heavy day on the 24th of August, when the enemy counte

a matter of finding a place where the guns would not disappear i

om the north-west corner of Inverness Copse to the junction with the First French Army sout

much point in going over orders. Brig.-Gen. Freeth reports (with some bitterness it seems to us): "Orders were received and issued so hurriedly that it was impossible for brigade and battalion staffs to keep pace with them. There was no

tending from the south-eastern corner of Stirling Castle to Black Watch Corner. On the 12th the 169th Brigade was ordered to undertake a small operation with the object of improving the line about Glencorse Wood, an undertaking which the 18th Division had failed to carry out. But the 169th Brigade met with strong opposition and also failed. On the 14th the enemy attacked the 167th Brigade, on the left of the line, and drove in some posts; they were re-established. Later on that day, at a conference, the Brigadier-General comm

rence with the Corps Commander and the G.O.C.

ad that there were reliefs, or remains of reliefs, going on every night. It was not possible to undertake any patrolling to gain

neral

he ground and had little opportunity for reconnaissance and preparation presented great difficulties in carrying out the assembly ... but th

e, was on the right. In the centre was the 169th Brigade with the 5th and 2nd London Regts. in l

answer to these signals for some minutes. But the new enemy system of defence in depth and by means of concrete forts was to be met for the first time by the 56th Division. The barrage was good

s point reacted on the 4th London Regt., which suffered very heavy loss and was brought to a standstill to the north of the west

* *

nt, but soon bumped into a marsh. The 2nd London Regt. edged to the right, pushing the London Rifle Brigade still farther away. And the same obstruction being met by the 167th Briga

ncorse Wood was finally cleared. The leading waves of the two battalions then went on and reached Polygon Wood, but what happened to them is not known. The second waves were checked at Polygon Wood by heavy fire from the front and the flanks, and before they could steady

The Battle of

le of Lange

ed on the leading wave until all became mixed, and no one carried out the special task of clearing the ground as it was won; the position was that, although the main weight of the attack was carried forward to the left of the 8th Middlesex, many enemy snipers were behind both battalions of the 167th Brigade. There is also, on this flank, the mystery of a company that disappeared. Although it seems pretty clear that the waves bun

th Brigade falling back through Glencorse Wood; they then took up a position to their rear, their southern flank

e attacking all along the 167th Brigade front. In view of the barrier of mud it is probable that he was only trying to reoccupy the

sition, which gave them a net gain of 400 yards beyond their origina

stminster Rifles, and the 7th Middlesex Regt. The division was relieved the following night by the 14th Divi

ampbell, Major V. A. Flower, Major J. E. L. Higgins, and Major M. R. Harris, all of the 13th London Regt. (Kensingtons); Lieut.-Col. R. R. Husey of the 5th London Regt.; Li

the London Territorials stands forth like something clean and honest in the midst of slime an

tion of the scheme of attack to those taking p

167th Brigade had only been in the line twenty-

were taken over in the area, and there was insuff

of Chateau Wood were non-existent, and t

aintaining sign

ious to the attack, ow

anebeck made a gap between the 169th and 167th Brigades, [Pg 161] which laid their left and

s were so timed as to strike the leading waves about the same time as they reached their objectiv

The heavy shelling prevented the moving up of reinforc

greed, disorganised our assaulting waves, although it did not stop them. But there is a limit to the possible advance of troops in a rush, and this had been calculated by the enemy, who pla

roops could cover without exhaustion, and they would then be at such a distance from any troops assembled for counter-attack as would give them time to consolidate

he 20th September, when the Second Army (Sir Herbert Plumer's command w

played the firmness which I, in common with the local commanders, had hoped for." By limiting the depth of penetration and breaking up the German counter-attacks with artillery fire the British troops were slowly eating their way through the defences in Flanders, in spite of ha

d his attacks through October. But the wet still continued, and important engagements, with large number

y on the Western Front by several [Pg 163] divisions, which were sent under the command of Sir Herbert Plumer, and later of Lord Cavan, to help our Italian Allies; it also determined Sir Douglas Haig to continue his opera

hree and a half months of the offensive the enemy had employed 78 divisions (18 of them had been engaged a second or third time after having rested and refitted). Deductions from such facts, however, are a weak bas

for this costly enterprise? Only damage to that highly important but very elusive thing which we call "enemy moral." The enemy charges us, perhaps with some truth, with being clumsy s

* *

fired by the artillery of that corps from the 23rd June to 31st August-2,766,824 rounds wi

of the Menin Road Ridge, 20th-25th September; Battle of Polygon Wood, 26th September-3rd October; Battle of Broodseinde, 4th October; Ba

n: Title or

, ZOUAVE WOOD, H

by Lt. Wallis Muirhead