The 56th Division

SO

BATTLE OF FLERS-COURCELE

ome as a revelation to some people. Those on active service very soon discovered that a long period of trench duty, though it hardened the men to those particular cond

as being a change of location, sometimes a mere matter of a mile or so, at others perhaps fifty miles. There were, it is true, no trenches to man, no sen

e optimistic [Pg 50] nature of the Higher Command always leaned to open warfare training. Companies wandered about, as they do in England, attacking villages, strong points, and woods, and i

ture of the reinforcements. Batches of men, from all sorts of units, were drafted to battalions, and

d with quite a high percentage of shrapnel. But whatever you did, however long the time you gave to cutting the wire, it never disappeared entirely; vile, treacherous strands stuck out of the earth like brambles, stakes remained miraculously upright with

ire to be

hought of tractors. At the same time, inventors were considering the old question of moving forts.

easily imagine the Middlesex men, and everybody else who had wind of what was afoot, all agog a

wn. But the practice was continued on subsequent days until each brigade had acquired experience. Sir Do

er. The second wave would start at zero plus three minutes; the third wave at zero plus five minutes; the fourth wave at zero plus six minutes. The infan

een much impressed by th

the XIV Corps (Cavan). And on the following day the artillery was ordered forward. The 168th and 169th Infantr

d Happy Valley, near Carnoy; on the 5th at Maricourt Siding. And on the 6th September

ars and buses, one must substitute a loose stone road covered with six inches of mud, and holes three feet deep filled with water, for the smooth wood paving of that thoroughfare. And there were no pavements, no sidewalks. The infantry threaded its way in single file through this mass of dirty carts, and s

al strain of muscle and sinew. Difficulties were overcome by straining horses, straining men, for where the greatest difficulty

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started on the 1st July, was an [Pg 53] advance of one mile on a front

r Hubert Gough, with instructions to keep the enemy busy whil

ined on to the left of the French, along the eastern edge of Trones Wood to Longueval, then westward past Bazentin-le-Grand to the northern corner of Bazentin-le-Petit (and the wood), and so to the north of Ovillers. Over 2,000 p

pplies. To relieve this most uncomfortable position, it was arranged that the right of the British Army should swing forward in conjunction with the French. To do this the French would have to capture the strongly fortified villages of Maurepas, Le Foret, Rancourt, and Frigicourt, while we would have to take all the [Pg 54] country up to Sailly-Saillisel and Morval

driven out. Guillemont was the important point to be gained, but it was evident that it could not be won in a small engagement, and as the only objective, without heavy loss. So we and

but the Fourth Army managed to win the much-disputed Guillemont, and after many assaults Falfemont Farm (which was only completely captured on the 5th) and the greater part of Leuze Wood. Ginchy and High Wood remained in the han

when the 56th Division marched forward to

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to grasp. The Somme field of battle was the most hideous place and absolutely bewildering. A guide was a treacherous person to trust, or perhaps we should say he was a broken reed to lean on; for the poor fellow had no treacherous intent in his heart, he

the country between Leuze Wood and Falfemont Farm, and had pushed troops into the wood itself; but the situation in the rest of the square marked 27 was very vague (see map)-the only certain thing was that there were ma

ed to be in support to the Royal Irish Rifles, and got into a two-foot scrape, unworthy of the name of "trench," about three-quarters of the way through

hells fell around Leuze Wood. It was one of the unavoidable accidents of war. Close shooting has to be done, and there are many possible causes, from faulty ammunition to wet ground, for guns

Scottish, as they were also being heavily bombarded by

The London Scottish reserve companies, which were at Wedge Wood, moved up, and the battalion prepared to defend Leuze Wood, which they imagined would short

, while probing about in the dark, the London Scottish gathered in two enemy

other side of the road. A platoon was sent forward the following morning to undertake this work. It was successfully carried out, and the cover

as officially known as "holding the line." At any moment a post might be wrested from you and h

toria's Rifles took over this bit of line, and

re was a slight readjustment of line the next night, and it was then held by the 169th Brigade on the right and in touch with

atureless country. But perhaps the chief cause of loss of direction was the shape of the jumping-off line. The German defence was very obstinate and the fighting severe. Troops, having made an advance, had to hang on anywhere, facing the enemy where he opposed them most fiercely. The result was a zigzag line, a crazy front, where troops frequently faced east and west and were told to attack

g due north; it then curled round the wood and faced south-east; another curl made the extreme

cing Combles, an attempt was made to clear the

On the night of the 8th they [Pg 59] made a bombing attack to clear the trenches on the south-east of the wood. At first this met with some success, but in the early morning

inchy and bring the line up to point 141·7, and from there down to Leuze Wood. Incidentally it meant clearing the ground to the south-east of the wood, but in following the actions from this date it must be remembered that the Higher Com

apturing the trenches south-east of the wood (the trenches they had failed to

ght (the advance from the northern end of the wood was very slight) and bring their left up to point

ion as a stationary barrage; the other 50 per cent. were to start just ahead of the infantry and creep forward at the rate of fifty y

resumption of attack were not dissimilar to those at the end, though not the actual termination, of an engagement-when nobody knows within a few hund

4.45 p.m., but on the left of the Corps it seems to have been delayed. Nowhere was it entirely

task as was ever set for any troops, and on their left was a German strong point bearing the ominous name of "the Quadrilateral

us spot, and the task of the London Rifle Brigade was to capture those trenches on the south-east [Pg 61] of the wood and start the building up of the f

on the far side of the Combles road, met with more success and gained a precarious footing in a part of

, almost simultaneously with a counter-attack by the enemy from his Bouleaux Wood defences. The Queen Victoria's Rifles held on to their ga

of Leuze Wood, gained their first objective under close cover of our barrage and with little loss. But the Rangers came under heavy machine-gun fire from their left.

e enemy and were driven back to their point of departure. The right company, however, after hard [Pg 62] figh

eir final objective. But their losses were severe. The machine-gun fire was tremendous, and its effects can be gathere

Again the murderous fire was poured on them from the left, and they swerved so that they came up on the centre of the 4th London troops. These two battalions were now on

Division was so much in the air that the enemy was on a

ont of Guillemont. The left brigade had secured a footing in Ginchy, and the 3rd Brigade of the Guards Div

nding officer, seeing something of what had happened, promptly tried to strengthen the flank of the 4th London Regt. and the Rangers

situation which faced General Hull at midnight was not a comfortable one. His left was surrounded by Germans, and probably only protected by the nig

were ordered t

the wood before dawn. The night was pitch dark, and the Germans were pouring shells into the wood. The exact bearing of the trench a

while the battalion waited casualties mounted up. At last came the dawn, but it broug

he sunken road leading to Combles. The barrage was described [Pg 64] as ineffective, which was, maybe, due to the fog. At any rate, ne

no success, and the situation during the whole of the morning

5th Cheshires on the extreme left of the original line of departure, and were ordered to thrust through, moving due north, and fill the gap be

out patrols. The last three waves were nowhere in sight; they had lost direction and joined the 4th London Regt. and Rangers on their right. But while the leading waves waited for their patrols to get in touch with either frien

letely lost, and so marched south

were sent to the trench occupied by the 4th London Regt. and the Rangers (Bully), wher

on. The guides of the left brigade of the latter division led a relieving battalion into Ginchy, but had only the haziest idea where their own troops were. Part of the 16th Di

t themselves completely, and a big gap existed between Ginchy and Guillemont. During the 10th this gap was made

t up several times. We may say that the battalion reports of positions were only relatively accurat

d that no one was near the Ginchy-141·7 road. The enemy still held the Quadrilateral [Pg 66] in force, and the most advanced troops of the 56th Division were some way from it, though they were strongly established in Bully T

defied all attempts to take it by bombing, and

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up the situation at

(just south of Combles), Le Foret, Cléry-sur-Somme, all three inclusive. The weak salient in the

nemy knew that an attack was coming, it would seem that he considered the troops already on the spot, secure in their apparent impregnable defences, would suffice to deal with it. The success of that assault, combined with the vigour and determination with which our troops pressed their advantage, and followed by the [Pg 67] successful attack on the night of 14th July, all served to awaken him to a fuller realisation of his danger. The great depth of his system of fortifications, to which reference

apse of his resistance during the last days of the struggle justified the belief that in the long-run decisive victory

dvantage of observation over the slopes beyond. East of Delville Wood, for a further 3,000 yards to Leuze Wood, we were firmly established on the main ridge; while farther east, acros

commanding a wide field of view and fire in every direction. At Leuze Wood my right was still 2,000 [Pg 68] yards from its objective at this village, and between lay a broad and deep branch of the main

the head of the Combles valley, which runs thence in a south-westerly direction. In the bottom of this valley lies the small town of Combles, then well fortified and strongly held, though dominated by my right at Leuze Wood, and by th

ects even more difficult. The line of the French advance was narrowed almost to a defile by the extensive and strongly fortified wood of St. Pierre Vaast on the one side, and on the other by the C

high ground south of the Ancre and north of the Albert-Bapaume road, while the Fourth Army devoted its w

ached the Morval line, the time would have arrived to bring forward my left across the Thiepval Ridge. Meanwhile our Allies arranged to continue the line of advance in close co-operation with me from the Somme to t

can be no doubt. Brigades resting in the rear of the divisional area cou

court, and Flers. The Cavalry Corps was to have its head on Carnoy at 10 a.m., and as soon as the four villages had been

which Tanks were employed! [T

in preparation of a further attack, since the 12th September. Day firing commenced at 6 a.m. and went on

days, with no increase until zero hour. When the intense fire, or bar

fifteen Tanks. Nine were allotted to the Guards Division,

before the infantry. When they had cleared up the first objective, a proportion of them was to push forward a short way, to prearranged positions,

50 yards a minute. For the third and fourth objectives there would be no creeping barrage, and Tanks would start in time to reach the objec

r by means of coloured flags-a red flag meaning "o

dvance as far as the bit of Beef Trench running through Bouleaux Wood, and to Middle Copse on the left of the wood; a flank was also to be formed to the south-east and clear of the wood. The 168th Brigade were to pass through the 167th and carr

igade to drive the enemy beyond the sunken road; it would then establish i

67th and 168th Brigades. These were known as the Centre and Left Tanks, and were eventually to proce

jectives, was to move along the south-east of Bouleaux Wood an

lumsy in the first design, but the ground was absolutely vile. [Pg 72] We have not alluded to the weather, which, however, was a most important factor just now. The field of battle was a field of mud; the resting area of the division was a fi

magine the results of repeated and obstinate attempts to capture a position to realise what it must look like before it is finally taken. An attack is launched and fails. Why does it fail? Perhaps twenty men of a company

ed with eight men to each stretcher, and each ambul

oke down on its way to the assembly position. This accident left the

n driving the enemy from the greater part of Loop Trench, the enemy clinging to the junction with the sunken road. The Tank, which was some time before reaching the sunken road, gave valuable assistance, but was set on fire by a direc

n support in Leuze Wood. The 1st London Regt. captured that portion of Beef Trench outside Bouleaux Wood and, tog

es road, and on the north-west of Bouleaux Wood to Beef Trench and Middle Copse. The enemy retained the whole of Bouleaux Wood and the trenches to the no

ey were of the 21st and 7th Bavarian Regts., of the 5th Bavarian Division. They were well wired in, and had in the Quadrilateral deep dugouts in their front lines and others in the ravine behind the position. But though we grant them a perfect position and well-constructed defences, we must also admit they performed a fine feat of arms. Those in the Quadrilateral had resisted all eff

it (and a perfect stream of fire was directed on it), and, the driver being badly wounded, it retired through the ranks of the 6th Division. Had the three Tanks attacked, something might have been done, anyhow with the enemy to the south-west of

mass of machine guns, and, taking the Guards Division in flank, inflicted fearful casualties. The first objective was taken and held-on the left the second objective was reac

ng Combles. Until the Quadrilateral was taken the 167th Brigade could not possibly move. The 7th Middlesex had lost a lot of men from machine guns firing i

so long. But at 1.30 p.m. the Corps Commander, Lord Cavan, telephoned him that the Guards had not made as much progress as he had thought, and that the operation against Bouleaux Wood would not be practicable. But before

tacks were carried out by the 169th Brigade on the sunken road [Pg 76] and end of Loop

eral and failed, but they were now well up to the strongh

de made a trench parallel to the sunken road to Combles, and also managed to occupy some

s, and the south-west face of Bouleaux Wood, to a point beyond Beef Trench, and from there through the wood to Middle Copse, where touch would be obtained with th

ound was rather worse than what is so frequent

rength to attack, so the London Scottish were attached to that b

g, failed to cross the fatal sunken road, which was not surprising, [Pg 77] as the mud by itself was an almost perfect obstacle from t

ve such strong support to the enemy troops holding Bouleaux Wood, wa

he 15th September and subsequen

ce beyond. On our right our line was advanced to within assaulting distance of the strong line of defence running before Morval, Les B?ufs, and Gueudecourt, and on our left High Wood was at last carried after many hours of very severe fighting, reflecting great credit on the attacking battalions. Our success made it possible to carry out

nsive. In the course of one day's fighting we had [Pg 78] broken through two of the enemy's main defensive systems, and had advanced on a front of over six miles to an average depth of a mile. In the course o

for the 5th Cheshire Regt., who connected Beef Trench with Middle Copse, and carried on two lines of trench in a north-easterly direction as far as the rail or tram line; companies of these pio

covering the digging parties were from the 2nd B

n the hands of the enemy, and on the right Combles still held out at the junction of the Allied Armies. An Allied attack from the Somme to M

on: Ginchy

chy &

the 9th, 15th

front of the division was then the 169th Brigade on the right between Leuze Wood and Combles, the 167th Brigade in Beef and Bully Trenches, and t

the left. The actual objectives of the 168th Brigade were some trenches between the north-east of the wood and the tram-line, also the bank and cutting of the tram-line.

t 12.35 p.m., and the Germ

n shell-holes round the north end of the wood, and suffered themselves somewhat from enemy snipers in the southern part of the wood. The London Scottish had some trouble and quite a stiff fight to clear the railwa

left [Pg 80] swept through all their obj

ove the position round Combles. By three o'clock in the afternoon the 4th London Regt. had two companies in the north end of Bouleaux Wood, and both the attacking battalions of the 168th Brig

e left edge of the wood. The 1st London Regt. was on one side of the Tank and the enemy on the other. On the right the Lond

the 169th Brigade had captured all of the sunken road trench and the Combles trench. And at dawn an officer's patrol of the 168th Brigade had met

with the 5th Division and the French; the 168th Brigade were a short distance in rear, round about the railway cuttings; and the 169th Brigade were half in Combles and half to the west of it. The Germans were some distance away, holding what was known

them in securing this very important position, Sir Douglas Haig agreed to hand over the line as far as Morval, so on

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raged. Sir Douglas Haig w

that Thiepval should be taken, in order to bring our left flank into line and establish it on the main

cess. On the right our troops reached the system of enemy trenches which formed their objective without great [Pg 82] difficulty. In Thiepval and the strong works to the north of it the enemy's resistance was more desperate.... On the left of

9th September the 167th Brigade was in Trones Wood, west of Guillemont, and the 169th in a camp near by. On the last night of September the latter br

Queen's Westminsters, Queen Victoria's, 1st Londons, and the 7th Middlesex. The orders were that they should send out patrols an

evoid of landmarks-it was just a wide expanse of shell-holes in a dark brown, almost black, kind of earth-and no one knew either their own position or those of the enemy within a few hundred yards; and the few

The 56th Division would capture Hazy, Dewdrop, Spectrum, and part of Rainbow, and establish a line along the west crest of the ridge; the Division would then, as a second phase of the attack, establish a line on the forw

division was on the slope of a hill, the troops might just as well have been in the midd

he attack were well beyond the line of posts it had been hoped to occupy with patrols, and the 2/1st London and 1/1st Edinburgh

d the left company of the 1st London Regt. drove the enemy out of the northern half of Spectrum and part of Rainbow, where they joined with the 2

rect covering fire; there were also six Stokes mortars in Burnaby to put a barrage on Dewdrop. In some respects the attack was peculiar. As was so often the case, the direction of the attack was at an angle to our front, and the London Scott

ern end of Dewdrop, and the reserve companies of the battalion came under a very heavy barrage and did not succeed in carrying

lay down unable to move. The rear waves were met with intense artillery fire, but [Pg 85] advanced most gallantly to the line of the leading troops. From the dead

of the battalion and the French, who had attacked east instead of north-east, and small parties of the London Scottish were successively pushed out to fill the gap and get touch. At six o'clock they had succeeded in establishing a thin but continuous line in touch wi

licted on the enemy, he succeeded in forcing the London Scottish and the right of the 4

n ordered a renewal of the attack on the next day, and sent up the London Rifle Brigade and the Que

[Pg 86] October, and almost at once Brig.-Gen.

ce of the previous day was repeated. The northern gun-pits, with their garrison of machine-gunners, was held by the enemy, who poured a devastating fire into the left flank of the four advancing waves, and on this occasion there was fire from th

eciable advance. Both Dewdrop and the south of Spectrum resting on the sunken road were strongly garrison

trench just south of the sunken road, and had a strong party of the Queen's Westmi

on: The Tr

Translo

gigantic one, but that effort had been made, and seemed to hang on the brink of success, and if the artillery could have helped a little more would have been entirely satisfactory. The artillery, however, were greatly handicapped. Maps could not tell them where the new enem

n had to be carried to Ginchy and frequently from there to Montauban. The medic

the 4th Division. The battles of the Somme were practically over.

sh haste, he had not been able to create any very formidable defences behind this line. In this direction, in fact, we had at last reached a stage at which a successful attack might reasonably be expected to yield much greater result

sault upon it was to secure the spur and the Sailly-Saillisel heights. Possession of the high ground at this latter village would at once give us far better command over the ground to the north and the north-west, secure the flank of our operations towards T

e mass of hastily-dug trenches for which we were fighting into channels of deep mud. The country roads, broken by countless shell craters, that cross the deep stretch of ground we had lately won, rapidly became almost impassable, making the supply of food, store

the 18th of the month, but by that time the weather had become so bad, and the delay had been so long, that the decisive moment had passed. [The

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ducted from the Operations on the Somme." Written with the incidents and conditions fresh on his mind, and for future guidance, it is not a criticism of the ac

ault being made direct at the objective. Failures, or partial failures, are attributable to present-day tro

ndmarks may be included. With the heavy casualties which occur among the officers, and considering the partially-trained

eme of assembly trenches should be thought out, and proper time given for

ther training, reinforcement officers are incapable of finding their way over unknown ground, even with good maps, and that they cannot tape out trenches and

stile defences. The reason is that assaulting troops edge away from the source of hostile fire, and when the l

es even against near objectives. One hostile machine gun may completely break up the first wa

t it is no good placing them there unless there is some suitable shelter (however small), and unless time is available to lay communication lines fo

omary. The average reinforcement officer is quite useless when his first appearance on service is in the middle of a modern battle. I would suggest that a battalion should go into action with from 12 to

ly reach their objective without heavy loss. Usually the standing barrage was put up behind the objective, and it is thought that the stand

at the last to move had to face a very heavy barrage in addition to machine-gun fire. It is thought that the infantry should always move at ze

ons with the heavy artillery. It is thought that the artillery gro

should be prepared for active operations, and also a supply of trench bridges

labour involved in getting the guns and ammunition forward. The trench mortar, from an administrative point of view, is more trouble than any other unit when fre

s require select crews of great determination, and officers in charge who have more experience and knowledge of the method

n that they are drawn towards the sound of fire, which must be read in conjunction with the admitted uncertainty of the exact position of an objective. During an attack no officer or N.C.O. can control more than half a dozen men, and the more usual number is two. On this basis the proportion of officers and N.C.O.s is totally inadequate, and it follows that success depends largely on the men themselves. The assaulting troops will fall

evere casualties; it was merely a case of moving a short way back to other trenches. After days of this sort of life an assault was a most exhausting experience and, if successful, was not finished with the written message, "We are on our objective." Exhausted men were cal

y other form of fighting. The reinforcements came almost as an added anxiety to the old men. And how could the new arrivals be expected to appreciate the advantage of followi

very little on this part of the battle front. To the infantry they seemed only to attract the attention of the enemy with the appalling noise they made and the [Pg 94] very definite target they afforded, and then they broke down! Col. Bayliffe's opin

and such successes were gained during the war-but not on the Somme. The enemy was strong and determined, and fought to the last. Gen. Falkenhayn, who was the instigator of the Verdun offensive, seems to rather pooh-pooh the battle of the Somme, and give the impression that it had little effect on the Central Powers; but as he was dismissed at the end of August, one might deduce that other p

ere bombing the enemy out of a trench or being bombed out themselves. And it is not too easy to decide what particular trenches were held at any one moment. The position in Loop Trench, for instance, was continually changing. Combles Tr

wo armies of different nationalities might always be considered a point of weakness, and the movement itself was on

take Combles

Sketch of plan

iously afforded. Further, in the actual attack on Morval and Les B?ufs this protecting flank had to be advanced to keep pace with the attack. The key of this was the capture of a trench about X-X

arly demonstrated. It requires good men to attack again and again until their object is gained, and when these attacks are launched against such splendidly trained soldi

much heroism-and the final, and perhaps fatal, stroke was snatched from our grasp by the weather; but

d first with Brussiloff's attack, and secondly with the Franco-British offensive on the [Pg 97] Somme. Falkenhayn declares that the most dangerous moment of the Russian offensive had been passed before the first shot of the battle of the Somme had been fired. H

by a strong thrust, to advance our line on the east bank.... After this it was the tension of the whole situation, and especially the necessity to husband our matériel and ammunition, which necessitated the abandonment of any big German offensive operations on the Meuse. The headquarters of the Crown Prince's Army Group were instructed to carry on the offensive calm

at he would seek to justify his policy, and persist that he was right and would have succeeded

off. The battles there exhausted our forces like an open wound. Moreover, it was obvious in any case that the enterprise had become hopeless, and that for us to perse

he Somme

will not hesitate to admit that it was only now that I fully realised all that the Western Armies had done hitherto.... I could now understand how everyone, officer

attle area of the Somme. The million of shell-holes filled with water became mere cemeteries.... Over everyone hovered

carries the impress

kept down our fire and destroyed our artillery. The defence of our infantry had become so flabby that the massed attacks of the enemy always succeed

p the battle of the Somme. Great were our losses. The enemy took Rancourt, Morval, G

he Somme front in quicker succession, and had to stay in the line longer. The time for recuperation and training on quiet sectors became short

umania, who had entered the war, was speedily defeated by the Central Powers, Italy was relieved and delivered a successful counter-attack on the Austrians. The situation, as a result of the Somme