The 56th Division

ARMI

ORD-BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, 1

ssuredly no greater than the turmoil in rear of the fighting troops. Activity, effort, unending toil, went on behind the line as well as in the line. As the troops drove the enemy in front of them, so engineers stood ready to rebuild the shattered railways and reconstruct the shell-battered roads. But the Army Serv

ble. The railway was through. Trains were in Boyelles, and lines of lorries stood, bei

ched a line from Cléry-sur-Somme, past the western edge of Marrières Wood to Combles, les B?ufs, Bancourt, Fremicourt, and Vraucourt. And, south of Péronne, Allied inf

ns) and were now on the high ground east of Cherisy and Hautcourt, and had captured Eterpigny. On the n

acked by the Canadian Corps and 4th Division, of the First Army, and the 52nd, 57th, and 63rd Divisions, of the

the whole of the Third Army front and on the right of the First Army. On the 3rd September the enemy was on the line of the Canal du Nord; on the following day he commenced to wit

dquarters were at Boisleux St. Marc, and on the 3rd September Sir Douglas Haig

nville area in readiness to relieve the 63rd Division in the line on the 5th. But at mid-day on the 5th this order was c

would be transferred to the XXII Corps and would relieve

res, by Inchy-en-Artois, Marquion to a place called Palleul, where it cuts across this marsh and joins up with the Canal de l'Escaut and the Canal de la Sensée. This water covers a stretch of ground running well to the west, towards the Scarpe, and tails off

nt about 500 yards north of Eterpigny, south of Etaing, south of L

nd 8th, command passing at 10 a.m. on the 9th September. The

the 3rd Canadian Division. Battalions then engaged in a series of side-stepping reliefs to the right until, on the 25th, the right of the division was on the Arras-C

th and 56th Divisions would relieve the left of the Canadians and attack due north along the eastern bank of the canal and towards the marshes of the Sensée. The 56th Division would be on

cations running through Maubeuge to Hirson and Mezières, by which alone the German forces on the Champagne front could be supplied and maintained. It had been decided that the Americans were to attack west of the Meuse in the direction of Mezières, the French west of the Argonne

h the Quéant-Drocourt system on the left. This would make the attack on the Bourlon Wood positions somewhat easier. But the whole system of d

. The problem on the left, which the 56th Division helped to solve, was that the northern portion of the canal was too formidable an obstacle to be crossed in the face of the enemy, and it w

y did not need this sort of warning. For days they had watched the assembling of batteries, stores, a gigantic army behind the infantry, who were ever keeping a steady pressur

t became apparent that the Canadians were meeting with strong opposition on the extreme left. They were timed to reach

Arras-Cambrai road. A similar bridge was to be made some 300 yards south of the road. The northern bridge was to be complete by 11 a.m. and the southern one by mid-day. But the village of Marquion was on the east of the canal, and on the Arras-

gone forward to construct their bridges, and had found themselves opposed by ho

estminsters and the London Rifle Brigade. The advance of the 169th Brigade to the assembly positions completed the clearing of the groun

London Rifle Brigade had one company between the two branches of the River Agache clearing up the ground, and two companies

the 2nd Londons were checked by machine-gun nests on the railway embankment south-west of Oisy. The 2nd Londons and the Londo

. But the [Pg 288] Queen's Westminsters worked cunningly round by the banks of the Agache, and eventually surrounded the Germans, capturing 1 officer and 22 other ranks (21 dead bodies were counted in the post). By 7 p.m. the line of t

chine guns in Mill Copse. The country was extremely difficult owing to water. Mill Copse could only be approached by a narrow pavé lane, which was flooded and much blocked by fallen trees. At 6.30 p.m. the leading compan

f Palleul, meeting with no resistance, but securing a few prisoners. A

ere: 12 officers, 501 other ranks, 4

-up causeway, and established [Pg 289] a bridgehead at Arleux, a village on the north of the marshes. The enemy made

guns. Consternation reigned at the headquarters of the Central Powers. The Austrian Peace Note made its appearance on the 15th September; Bulgaria surrendered on the 29th; and Da

s prolonged to the right, when the 168th Brigade took over from the 11th Division, up to a point on the eastern outskirts of Aubencheu. The enemy were very alert, and opened h

a further length of front and relieve the whole of the 11th Division, who had their right flank on the village of Fressies. The object was to free the 11th Division, so that they could follow the

es of Arleux, Aubigny-au-Bac, and Brunement were still occupied. Both the 167th Brigade on the left and the 168th on the right sent out patrols, which were fir

ng. Patrols found that the enemy was still holding Fressies, and

m. on the 11th October. Two companies only attacked, and the casualties were 1 killed and 9 wounded

the left was the VIII Corps, and, on this same day, they captured Vitry-en-Artois and drove the enemy back on Douai. On receipt of this news the 56th Divisional Artillery was ordered to keep the crossings of the canal from Arleux n

ard on the north of the ponds and marshes for some days, and on the 12th they captured Arleux in the early hours of the morning. The 167th Brigade

rise to capture Aubigny-au-Bac was then undertaken; in the words of Gen. Hull, "initiated and carried out entirely under the

n's Westminsters in line, and as the front was very extended, Brig.-Gen. Coke decid

e and had no bridges. Strong German posts were stationed at two points, where bridges had former

e Queen's Westminsters as soon as possible after dark, and, after landing, the officers were to ascertain whether a sufficiently large area, free of the enemy, existed

o were to attack had to carry up the material. It was raining, and the approach was ov

would proceed at once with the foot-bridge. By three o'clock in the morning the bridge had been constructed, and the patrol of Queen's Westminsters went across. One cannot give higher praise to the engineers than th

as the enemy had not opened fire, the brigadier ordered th

y surface. The night, however, was very dark and the rain was perhaps a great advantage. A platoon of the 2nd Londons crossed over stealthily a

barrage was arranged against the flank of the enemy position, creeping in a north-westerly direction. To follow it in an ordinary way was out of the questi

well as he was able, in the blackness of early morning, when dawn is postponed by rai

d side of the enemy position. Two machine-gun teams tried to resist, but after several had been

ossible to occupy the station, where the enemy was strong and thoroughly rouse

pporting company came up and were used to

n a lot of trouble. They were engaged with rifle grenades and rushed successfully. The

ed parties of the enemy moving towards Aubigny. These were quickly dispersed, with many casualties, by t

ed attack, with a force estimated at a battalion, from the north, and a smaller force from Brunemont. In spite of heavy losses, the Germans pressed on and slowly outflanked one post aft

though the four Stokes mortars of the brigade battery, which supported the 2nd Londons

all troops had returned to the southern bank. They brought with

ox, of the 416th Field Coy. R.E., jumped into the water and held the cork floats, which supported the structure, together, getting their fingers badly trodden on by the patrol. But the patrol crossed before the two gallant men let go. Cpl. McPhie, realising the serious position of the men who had crossed to the nort

to work with bullets cracking like whips round his ears. He was shot in the head and fell in the water. Sapper Cox tried to pull him out, but Cpl. McPhie had sufficient strength to tell him to leave go, as he hims

pe to Cox. This wonderful man still had the streng

two day

warded the V

* *

s and 165 other ranks passed over the canal. But this small force captured 4 officers and 203 other ranks.

er, they held the bridgehead and patrolled the north bank of the canal. But on the 15th the

Arras. On the 15th the 167th Brigade was relieved by the 11th Canadian Brigade and moved to Rumancourt. On

n: Title or

of the Ca

hen the great advance commenced railhead was at a place called Tincques; on the 23rd August it changed to Gouy-en-Artois; on the 27th to Beaumetz; on the 31st to Boisleux-au-Mont. On the 8th September it was at Arras and on the 11th October at Qué

e 23rd October, and then rested in the neig

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was driven through such systems of defence as existed behind it. The threat at the enemy's communications was

sions, the whole force under the King of the Belgians, had attacked

h Army under Gen. Birdwood. This army was in front of the Lys salient, which was thus left between the northern and southern attacks wit

left flank of the Allied forces rested on the Dutch frontier. The Fourth, Third, and First Armies

was becoming embarrassed by his own rearguards pressing on his heels as they were driven precipitately

* *

tober Austria

e Italians cro

e Serbians rea

er Turkey was gra

ers lay gasping

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auled in accordance with a pamphlet numbered O.B./1919 and issued by the General Staff. It was designed to deal with the decre

that a platoon, so long as it contained two sections of three men each, was not to be amalgamated with any other p

headquarters, which must in an emergency be temporarily reduced. After the requirements of the fighting portion for reconstruction have been met (50 other ranks), if the battalion is up to its full establishment, a balance of 208 men will remain for the administrative portion (90) and for reinfo

e to detail six men and one non-commissioned officer to each post. With double sentries this gave each man one hour on and two hours off-anything less than these nu

attalion as arranged by thi

der

hting p

istrative

tion (not for

es for rei

B C

O.R. Off. O.R. O

5 70 2 66 2

74 - 24 4

s - 2 -

12 38 - 4 4

latoon sergeants - 10

ion - - -

8 - - - 16

90 10 50

and administrative minimum. The ration strength of battalions from the 1

ptember. Octo

ff. O.R. Off.

950 35 678

948 38 787

931 27 613

98 32 710 3

925 24 685

925 30 548

91 27 599 3

89 25 669 3

959 27 577

n the ration strength. Guards, fatigue parties, sudden demands for men from higher commands, dozens of reasons could be given for the evaporation of strength. Probably tw

subjects of organisation and training wi

red by "Bow Bells," which were to be heard at the

headquarters at Basseville, and on the 1st November was or

Canal de l'Escaut to the outskirts of the village of Famars, the 49th Division, on the high ground west of

h the object of capturing the two villages of Preseau and Saultain, but only

r trench [Pg 302] lines, but tactical features, such as spurs, rivers, woods, and village

sion on the right and the 56th on the left, was given as the "general line of the Aunelle River left bank." The Canadian Corps would

f enemy retreat the G.O.C. intends to push on mounted troops to secure the crossing of the Petite Aunelle River and will

l of the Brigadier a battery of field artillery,

rigade, of the 49th Division, remained in line on the left, and was to advance

he enemy had retired. The two brigades advanced and occupied Saultain, which was full of civilians, before mid-day. The cavalry and a company of [Pg 303] New Zealand Cyclists were then ordered to push fo

from about thirty of the enemy who were rounded up, but when they attempted to advance east of the village they came under intense machine-gun and rifle fire from the high ground.

find that they were not only faced with the enemy on the high ground to the east, but that heavy enfilade fire was being directed on them from the village of Rombies, on the western bank of

Elkington in a short report drawn up at the end of the operations. He says the barrage put down on the 1st November had bee

f the enemy who were delaying our advance and enabling the main body of the enemy to retire. The enemy blew up bridges an

ion commander and keeping good communication with his battery, could bring fire to bear at very short time on targets as they were encoun

or brigades, on wheels in rear could be moved up to reinforce the artillery in the line to put down a barrage for an attack, or, if no resistance was encountered, a brigade in rear could advance through the artillery in

pport them with a great weight of artillery, it is not possible to push this mass of artillery forward when movement bec

the infantry to march forward, but on the engineers behind them, who were reconstructing the roads and railways for the s

es, where the rim of the crater comes in many cases up to the walls of the houses. Culverts are blown on main roads, and a particularly effecti

rable, as it rained practically every day. When craters were encountered, the leading vehicles could perhaps get round, by going off the road, but they had the effect of churning up the sof

the infantry must be ranked as one of the finest in the war. One cannot get a picture of the advance by considering the mere width of an army front. The infantry were the spearhead, the supplies the shaft, but th

distribution of rations, engineer material, ordnance, mails, and billeting. In the orders for advance the General Staff informed the Brigadier-General what units, or portion of divisional troops, including Divisional Artillery, would be under his tactical control, and these units, irrespective of their arm o

* *

instructions for th

satisfactory, as if the two échelons both move at the same time, all touch is lost. Prior to the advance, therefore, the administrative staff of each brigade group will fix a 'meeting-point' or 'rear report centre' as far forward as possible on the probable line o

e worked well for the artillery, as w

al Artillery the system of using village churches as report centres was successfully tried, but, owing to the cessation of hostilities, the trial was not as exhaustive as could be wished.

e original scheme would

s a preliminary to subsequent advance. The London Rifle Brigade led the attack of the 169th Brigade at 5.30 a.m., and by 7.30 a.m. had captured the village of Angreau. Here they were checked by the

as still held by the enemy. The situation was somewhat eased by the capture of Rombies, by the 4th Canadian Division, and at 3 p.m. the artillery put down a rolling barrage, behind

of the 169th Brigade attacked in gas-masks and crossed the river. The 168th Brigade, attacking with the London Scottish and Kensingtons in line, met at first with slight resistance, but as soon as the river was reached they were faced with a heavy barrage of artillery and machine-gun fire. In spite of very accurate fire, they [Pg 309] succeeded in crossing the river to the

d in front of them, and the London Rifle Brigade shot ahead on the left, outside the wood. The enemy rallied and counter-attacked the forward troops, while at the same time a force of Germans debouched from the wood on the right flank of the Rifle Brigade men, who were driven back to the west of the river. Some of the 2nd Londons wer

ned on the west bank. The casualtie

ossing the river, and definitely established themselves to the east and in touch with the London Scottish. The casualties of the 168th

a cart through places which would be impossible for a motor lorry-and civilian wagons were pressed into service, being used in conjunction with sp

lgian housewife was replenished with reckless disregard for "to-morrow." And then as the country was regained, so the villagers were cut off from the source which had provided them with their limited supplies. With Germans in retreat on one

n: Title or

enera

great [Pg 311] Forest of Mormal, and troops were well to the east of it. The German rearguards were only able, on especially favourable positions, to check the advance of a few divisions; on the whole the rearguards were being thrown back

168th Brigade, and the 169th was relieved by the 167th Brigade. The 56th Division was th

on through the northern part of the wood, and by 10.30 a.m. the 7th Middlesex entered the village of Onnezies. The Petite Honnelles River was crossed, and the village of Montignies taken in the

, and when the advance was continued at 8 a.m., the two Middlesex battalions occupied the villages of Athis and Fayt-le-Franc wit

ruction of the bridges. Rain fell all the time, and cross-country tracts were impassable. All traffic was thrown on the main roads, which, to the west of the river, we

h the Canadians were approaching Mons. The 56th Division marched forward through the villages of Coron, Rieu-de-Bury, Quevy-le-Grand, a

antry had passed through Harvengt, when heavy machine-gun fire from both flanks held up the advance. A squadron of 16th Lancers atte

was in action on the 23rd August 1914, at the battle of Mons. Gen. Hull, on the other hand, had actually held an outpost line before Harmignies with his battalion on the 22nd August, and had moved to the north to hold a line from Obourg to Mons on the 23rd. After the battle the celebrated retre

ommander in August 1914 within five mile

sued orders that hostilities would cease at 11 a.m.

, in the midst of the rolling thunder of rapid fire, teams straining every nerve to throw the last shell into the breach of their gun b

writes Brig.-Gen. Elkington. "They seemed too tired,

g

.Q.

ovembre

ficiers, Soldats d

l'avez pendant des mois, avec une foi et u

lle de l'Histoire et sauvé la cause

z Fi

rtelle vous avez

ous garde sa r

chal de

n Chef les A

F

gt. They mended the roads, they drilled, and they had sports. Towards the end of January 1919

16th January, and the 7th Middlesex to the 41st Division on the 25th

th Division returned the first cadre on th

alties of this

ers

anks

3

nd